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due to the nature of the CAP and the direction of CAP
reform in Agenda 2000. The CAP was essentially a scheme
of price support, with costs for both the consumer and the
taxpayer. Consumers support the agricultural sector
through high internal prices (known as intervention 
prices, fixed above world market level). The system of
administered prices implies that internal prices must be
kept above world market prices by imposing tariffs on
(extra-EU) imports and by giving refunds on exports (see
Merbis and Stolwijk (1996) for a formal representation
of the CAP). In case of excess supply, surpluses must be
bought and held in storage (called intervention stocks) or
sold with a subsidy. The CAP also invokes production con-
trols to ensure market clearing. Milk and sugar produc-
tion is governed by quotas, and a substantial share of agri-
cultural land is left idle (called set-aside land). This scheme
is compulsory for arable farmers to become entitled to
income transfers. Other instruments, such as supply and
demand subsidies and direct income payments, complete
the working of the CAP.
The core of the proposals in Agenda 2000 is a further
shift from price support to income support. The level of
intervention prices is lowered, and to prevent a strong fall
in farmers’ incomes the level of income support (called
premiums in CAP jargon, since linked to specific pro-
duction activities) must go up. Support to agriculture then
appears in the budget (‘budgetarisation’ of support).
Premiums were introduced in the agricultural budget in
1993, and its role has increased ever since. The increasing
role for income transfers ensures that a substantial share
of the total EU budget will need to be allocated to the
financing of farm policy.
The outlays in the CAP budget determine member 
states’ benefits from the CAP. The expenditures on the CAP
(as well as other costs the Community is incurring) must
be balanced by the own revenues of the EU and the mem-
ber states’ contributions. The difference of benefits and
costs, allocated to member states, is an explicit transfer
to (or from) the administration in Brussels. The debate on
net positions is usually a debate on these explicit trans-
fers. However, price support also generates implicit trans-
fers. When a producer exports a CAP commodity inside
the EU, the foreign consumer has to pay the internal price.
Countries with large intra-EU exports thus benefit from
implicit subsidies paid by the net-importing member 
states. Several studies have already pointed at the sig-
nificance of implicit transfers in the discussions on the
principle of ‘common financial responsibility’ (see Folmer
et al. (1987, 1995), Kjeldahl et al. (1994), CEC (1994) and
Keyzer (1995)). Yet, other studies (Ministry of Finance, 1997,
Lemmink 1995) do not acknowledge the importance of
implicit transfers in the debate on net contributions.
Abstract
The budgetary consequences of the reform proposals
in Agenda 2000 have stimulated the debate on the
financial costs and benefits of EU-membership. This
article analyses the implications of the proposed agri-
cultural reform for the net contributions by simulating
three scenarios. The inclusion of implicit trade subsi-
dies is vital in the discussion on net positions. Agenda
2000 is projected to affect substantially the net posi-
tions of member states.
Samenvatting
De budgettaire gevolgen van de hervormingsvoor-
stellen in het Agenda 2000 rapport hebben het debat
over de financiële kosten en baten van het EU-lid-
maatschap aangewakkerd. Dit artikel bespreekt de
effecten van de voorgestelde aanpassingen aan het
Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid op de netto bij-
dragen, aan de hand van drie scenario simulaties. Wij
illustreren ook het belang van impliciete handelssub-
sidies in de discussie over netto posities. Agenda 2000
zal de netto positie van de lidstaten aanzienlijk beïn-
vloeden.
Introduction
In July 1997 the European Commission (CEC, 1997a) 
launched a set of proposals to prepare the EU for major
upcoming events such as the enlargement with Central
and East European countries. The package specifies the
budget of the Community over the period 2000-2006,
which serves as ceiling on the expenditures and deter-
mines to a large extent the costs for the member states.
The proposals therefore tend to revive the debate on the
distribution of financial gains and losses over the mem-
ber states. Some of the net paying countries, in particu-
lar the Netherlands and Germany, question the future pat-
tern of net contributions, as they criticized the past allo-
cations.
This article focuses on the contributions arising from
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A considerable
part of the EU budget is still devoted to the financing of
the CAP (agricultural expenditures accounted for 46% of
total EU expenditures in 1995, down from 75% in the mid-
eighties). The agricultural budget will remain important
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This article focuses on the relevance of the implicit sub-
sidies for the discussion as how to assess net positions.
It analyses the effects of the further budgetarisation of
support on the EU-budget and the financial transfers of
the member states. The Agenda 2000 proposals will affect
the size of both the explicit and the implicit contribu-
tions due to its shift to direct transfers as main instruments
to support farmers. The consequences are quantified by
simulating three scenarios with the CAP-Modelling and
Accounting Tool (CAPMAT)1 for the EU15 member states.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next sec-
tion briefly sketches the proposed reform in Agenda 2000.
After describing the model and the scenarios, we discuss
simulation outcomes. The last section concludes.
The agricultural chapter in Agenda 2000
The agricultural chapter in Agenda 2000 proposes an exten-
sion of the reform of 1992, so a brief review of this reform
is useful. It introduced premiums to compensate farmers
for the reduction in intervention prices and the imposed
set-aside scheme. These measures were only applied to
cereals, oilseeds, pulses and beef. After its implementa-
tion, the 1992 reform became instrumental for the con-
clusion of the GATT agreement in 1994. Premiums were
sufficient to prevent a fall in average farming income, but
nevertheless the agricultural budget remained safely below
the spending guidelines.
Major shortcomings of the 1992 reform are the limited
coverage and depth. Measures were not extended to other
sectors, like sugar and dairy, nor further deepened to tackle
the various market distortions. Despite the fall in inter-
vention prices, the gap between internal and world 
prices remained substantial for many products. Market
access was not effectively improved, in particular for 
developing countries.
The GATT agreement imposes restrictions on the sub-
sidized exports of agricultural products. Therefore the EU
has only limited scope to expand on world markets of
cereals, milk products and beef, whereas most projections
of world food demand are promising. While the new WTO
round will start in 2000, the EU has to prepare for nego-
tiations aimed at a further liberalization of agricultural
policies. The EU also has to prepare for the enlargement
with Central and East European countries, which asks for
a reduction of intervention prices to facilitate the harmo-
nization of agricultural prices between the new and old
member states. Hence, pressures increase to adapt the
CAP.
Agenda 2000 can be viewed as a response to these
challenges. The central part of the proposals, which were
finalized in March 1998, is a reduction of intervention prices
for cereals, beef and milk. The fall in income is compen-
sated by higher premiums and lessening of production
controls. The compulsory set-aside rate is set to zero,
whereas milk quota are increased by 2%. To simplify the
rules, premium rates for the concerned arable crops are
equalized. The system of premiums for the livestock sec-
tor is expanded, and made more complex. The Commission
aims at reaching an agreement on the final text at the end
of 1998 and a gradual implementation starting in 2000.2
The model
CAPMAT is developed to calculate the medium run effects
of CAP reforms for each of the 15 member states. The
underlying database integrates information from various
sources, notably commodity balances from FAO, costs
and revenues of agricultural activities from EUROSTAT
and detailed budgets from the CEC. As a second input
source, outcomes of the applied general equilibrium model
ECAM are used for projecting behavioral reactions by pro-
ducers and consumers (see Folmer et al., 1995). The plan-
ning horizon is 2005.
Since intervention stocks are fixed by assumption, net
exports by member state follow from commodity balance.
As regards pricing rules, CAP commodities follow the
common EU-intervention price while prices of other goods
reflect assumed world prices. Detailed computations
are performed to retrieve (1) commodity balances by coun-
try, (2) costs and revenues by activity and country, (3) farm-
ing income  by country and (4) the EU-budget.
The scenarios
We distinguish three scenarios, presented in more detail
in Bettendorf and Merbis (1998). These share the assump-
tions on world market prices, yield trends and total avail-
ability of land. For reasons of transparency, changes in
EU policy are thus assumed not to affect the evolution of
world prices, as projected by international organizations.
In accordance with their forecasts, cereal prices will decline
from their record levels in 1996 back to the levels of the
early nineties. In view of expanding markets, world prices
for dairy products and beef are believed to increase slightly.
All figures are expressed at 1995 prices by assuming an
inflation rate of 1% per year. Scenario-specific assump-
tions are summerized in the box.
Results
Central EU-budget
The structure of the EU-budget is summarized in Table 1
(cf. European Court of Auditors, 1997). At the expenditures
side, the largest share in 1995 is taken up by outlays for
the CAP. The agricultural budget is regrouped into three
main categories: trade refunds, premiums & subsidies
and remaining expenditures. Outlays on other (structural)
funds and other expenditures (e.g. development aid, admin-
istration costs) complete the EU-budget.
The national (VAT and GDP) contributions have become
the major source of revenues. Receipts of an agricul-
tural origin consist of tariffs levied on agricultural imports
and of levies imposed on sugar production. The other two
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items concern duties on non-agricultural imports and
remaining revenues (e.g. surplus of previous year).
In the simulations, the agricultural reform is taken in
isolation by fixing the non-agricultural revenues and expen-
ditures at their 1996 level.3 Results for the EU15 are com-
pared to the Base scenario in 2005. The budgetarisation
of support in Agenda 2000 raises agricultural expendi-
tures: the increase of premiums more than offsets the sav-
ings on export refunds. The growth of the agricultural bud-
get (18%) is financed by an increase of the VAT and GDP
contributions (12%). With the elimination of premiums in
the Liberal scenario, the budget shrinks and the contri-
butions are lowered (-41%). In the following subsections
the effects on refunds and premiums are examined per
country.
Net subsidies on agricultural trade
When internal prices exceed world market prices, tariffs
are levied on imports and refunds are given on exports.
These transfers are distributed over the member states
according to their shares in gross exports (for refunds)
and gross imports (for levies). For simplicity, these 
shares are fixed at the 1992 level. Table 2 gives the simu-
lated difference between refunds and levies on agricul-
tural trade for 1995 and 2005.
Obviously, net refunds are the largest for countries with
a large share in exports, like France and the Netherlands,
and the smallest for countries with a small share, like
Spain, UK and Italy. Net refunds on Dutch exports are
mostly paid for dairy products (51%), beef (22%) and sugar
(11%, in 1995). Net refunds per commodity are equal to
the difference between internal and external prices, times
net extra-EU exports. So, net refunds per unit are smaller
in 2005 since the gap between internal and external prices
narrows in all scenarios. The impact on net exported quan-
tities is driven by changes in supply and demand.4 In total,
the Agenda 2000 and Liberal scenarios generate sub-
stantial savings on trade subsidies compared to the
Basecase (-46% and -62%, respectively). 
Premiums and subsidies
The most important part of the agricultural budget com-
prises premiums and subsidies on production, inputs and
consumption (net of levies on sugar production), as illus-
trated in Table 3. These outlays increase by 36% in Agenda
2000, illustrating the budgetarisation of support. Premiums
and subsidies more than double for Belgium, Ireland and
the Netherlands. The share of the Netherlands in total pre-
miums remains small because it is not much specialized
in sectors under reform and modulation factors reduce
the potential premiums. The premiums are distributed
to member states according to the production patterns of
the EU. This distribution is uneven: about 90% of the 
premiums from cereals and 75% of the cattle premiums
accrue to five member states. This constitutes a reason
The scenarios
Basecase
This status-quo scenario assumes a continuation of
existing policies:
– intervention prices and premium rates are kept con-
stant in nominal terms.
– outlays on premiums are limited at the 1996 level
by the use of stabilizer mechanisms
– the future rate of the compulsory set-aside is fixed
at 5%.
Agenda 2000
The latest version of the  proposals (March 1998) are
implemented in the following way:
– intervention prices are reduced for cereals (20%),
beef (30%) and milk (15%).
– all cereals and oilseeds now receive the same pre-
mium per ton. Cows and male bovines receive
headage premiums, as a (partial) compensation for
the price fall.
– the mandatory set-aside rate is set to zero.
– milk quotas are increased by 2%, distributed non-
uniformly over the countries.
– the level of the premium rates as proposed may dif-
fer from the level actually paid to the farmer due to
regulations that specify the eligibility to premiums.
We express this difference as ratios, in the so-called
modulation factors. As an example of modulation,
beef premiums are limited to a fixed number of ani-
mals per farm, and are subject to a livestock den-
sity constraint (e.g., two cows per hectare of fodder
land are eligible for premiums). Since the new pro-
posals impose some new constraints and modify
some old ones, the size of the modulation factors
is still uncertain. In this scenario, the observed mod-
ulation factors of the 1992 reform are applied to the
premiums for non-dairy cattle. No modulation is
assumed for the new premiums of dairy cows. For
crops, a reference acreage holds as constraint, lim-
iting total expenditures.
Partial liberalization
From a free-trade perspective, the reduction in agri-
cultural support can be criticized for being insufficient.
A partial liberalization scenario will serve as an alter-
native benchmark, analyzing agriculture in a much
more competitive setting:
– the fall of intervention prices is as in Agenda 2000,
with additional reductions for sugar (20%) and sheep
(30%).
– premiums and subsidies on CAP commodities are
abolished (subsidies remain in sectors falling out-
side the Agenda 2000 reform).
– set-aside and milk quotas are as in Agenda 2000.
Alternatively, the Liberal scenario can be interpreted
as an extension of the Agenda 2000 program, in which
compensation payments are already phased out in
2005 and the coverage of commodities is expanded.
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for concern about the net position. In the Liberal scenario
the elimination of premiums and subsidies on CAP com-
modities reduces the expenditures by 82% (the south-
ern member states still receive subsidies on olive oil).
Net contributions
The calculation of net contributions requires all items in
table 1 to be allocated over the member states (remem-
ber that the non-agricultural items are fixed at the 1996
level). Some of the revenues and expenditures are not
allocated to the member states, but to the Commission.
These revenues (11% in 1995) mainly stem from the sur-
plus of the previous year, exchange rate gains and can-
cellations of the previous year. Expenditures (24%) cover
administration costs, development aid
and the current surplus.
The net position of a member state
is simply defined as the difference
between the total revenues from the
EU and total payments to the EU. From
the simulated net positions in table 4
follows that EU-policy is primarily paid
by Germany, with major contributions
from the Netherlands and the UK (note
that the inclusion of the European
Commission in the list makes the aver-
age net contribution negative). Agenda
2000 causes substantial changes in the
net contribution, but affects the rank-
ing of the countries only slightly. The
net position improves for countries
with a relative strong specialization
in cattle, like Ireland and UK. The reform
turns out disadvantageous for the net
payers Germany and the Netherlands.
The changes under the Liberal scenario
indicate the countries benefitting from
the current CAP. Germany emerges as
the greatest (absolute) winner and
France as the biggest loser from par-
tial liberalization. The net position of
the Netherlands improves in this sce-
nario due to the reduction in VAT and
GDP contributions.
Expressed in per capita terms,  the
net contribution for the Netherlands
belongs to the largest in the EU.5
Therefore, the Dutch government ques-
tions the current distribution of net
financial gains, following the principle
that countries in a similar situation
should be treated alike. A detailed dis-
cussion of the virtues and limitations
of this concept is beyond the scope
of this paper.6 Clearly, the financial ben-
efits and costs of EU-membership, let alone the non-finan-
cial gains and losses, are too heterogeneous to be cap-
tured by one single figure. We consider only one aspect,
namely the implicit subsidy.
Implicit subsidies
The calculated explicit net contributions give an incom-
plete picture since the implicit benefits from the CAP price-
support are not incorporated (see Folmer et al., 1995, sec-
tion 6.4). Such benefits appear because exporters of CAP
commodities to other member states are paid in internal
and hence higher prices than world market prices. In con-
crete terms, Dutch exporters of cheese receive an implicit
subsidy from, say, German consumers when settling their
Table 1 The simulated EU15-budget, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
bln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Total agricultural budget 35.2 32.0 37.7 10.6
– Trade refunds 7.7 4.9 2.7 2.1
– Premiums & subsidies 24.6 23.2 31.2 4.7
– Other agr. expenditures 2.9 3.8 3.8 3.8
Other funds 15.9 20.4 20.4 20.4
Other expenditures 24.6 22.3 22.3 22.3
Total expenditures 75.7 74.7 80.4 53.4
Levies on agricultural trade 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
Levies on sugar production 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.6
Duties on non-agr. trade 13.9 13.1 13.1 13.1
National contributions 52.9 50.7 56.6 30.0
Other revenues 6.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
Total revenues 75.7 74.7 80.4 53.4
Table 2 Net trade refunds for CAP products, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
mln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Austria 93 61 26 19
Belgium-Luxembourg 645 399 269 175
Denmark 377 269 176 152
Finland 53 35 19 16
France 1839 1435 691 416
Germany 1332 854 432 311
Greece 30 37 13 5
Ireland 582 274 110 127
Italy 271 184 105 68
Netherlands 1006 567 382 323
Portugal 3 1 11 2
Spain 152 85 60 40
Sweden 53 45 20 19
UK 270 234 105 15
EU-15 6706 4479 2419 1688
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bills at intervention prices rather than at world 
prices. The total (explicit plus implicit) subsidy due to trade
protection is computed for each member state by multi-
plying its net total exports with the difference between
internal and export prices. Subtracting the explicit 
subsidies given in table 2 yields the implicit subsidies in
table 5.
In 1995 countries like the Netherlands, France and Ireland
receive relatively large implicit subsidies, reflecting their
strong export position of products with high internal prices
(beef, dairy). For the Netherlands this subsidy equals
almost 70% of the explicit net contri-
bution. Implicit support is paid by the
importing countries, such as Italy and
UK. In 2005 implicit transfers are
reduced in absolute value for all sce-
narios due to the fall of internal prices
relative to external prices. In other
words, Agenda 2000 will decrease the
implicit gain (loss) for the net export-
ing (importing) countries. The only
exception is Germany, where the dom-
inating effect on net imports results in
increased implicit subsidies.
Total net contribution
In view of the size of the implicit trans-
fers, one should also look at the total
net contribution,  computed as the sum
of the previous two tables. Rankings
of total contribution per capita are given
between brackets in table 6. 
The explicit and the total contribu-
tions are first compared for 1995. The
incorporation of implicit subsidies does
not much affect the ranking for most of
the countries: Germany  remains the
largest payer and Ireland and Greece
the largest receivers (per capita).
However, there are exceptions. The rank-
ing of the Netherlands considerably
improves when the broader definition
is applied. Whereas the explicit contri-
bution seems not to conform with its
relative prosperity, the total contribu-
tion looks more reasonable. In terms
of this broader concept, the Netherlands
occupies the pursued middle position
in the EU. In contrast, Belgium, Italy and
the UK face opposite changes. Whereas
their explicit losses seem limited, their
total positions show that they effec-
tively co-finance the current CAP.
Next, total contributions are dis-
cussed for 2005. Implicit transfers
become less important and the rankings are quite stable
over the scenarios. The net position of the Netherlands
will deteriorate under Agenda 2000 due to a substantial
reduction in implicit subsidies. When the Netherlands pur-
sues a reduction of its net contribution, it should object
price reductions compensated by premiums. Along the
same line of reasoning, it should be in favor of partial
liberalization, which is more in line with its credentials
as free trading nation. Notice that its ranking in 2005
becomes worse than in 1995 for each scenario.
Table 3 CAP premiums and subsidies, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
mln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Austria 351 410 569 – 9
Belgium-Luxembourg 179 175 389 – 15
Denmark 636 635 896 32
Finland 235 171 239 – 8
France 5695 5755 7113 315
Germany 3003 3172 4644 30
Greece 2091 2240 2158 1558
Ireland 636 562 1247 22
Italy 2974 3261 4326 1178
Netherlands 389 294 680 62
Portugal 435 345 400 107
Spain 4057 2533 3192 768
Sweden 347 384 620 – 9
UK 2188 1984 3397 18
EU-15 23215 21930 29870 4049
Table 4 Net (explicit) contribution (mln ecu), 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
mln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Austria – 848 – 170 – 210 – 53
Belgium-Luxembourg – 905 – 929 – 1040 – 659
Denmark 119 15 72 – 311
Finland – 149 – 10 – 41 83
France – 1158 – 373 – 870 – 2926
Germany – 13079 – 9577 – 10292 – 7056
Greece 3429 3723 3520 3354
Ireland 1736 1595 2064 1089
Italy – 632 – 1237 – 1056 – 600
Netherlands – 2220 – 2355 – 2443 – 1814
Portugal 2458 2805 2783 2836
Spain 7206 5218 5451 4815
Sweden – 915 – 650 – 600 – 504
UK – 4741 – 2365 – 1646 – 2564
EU-Commission 9698 – 4309 4309 4309
Note: column elements add up to zero.
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Conclusions
A simulation model is used to study the consequences of
the agricultural reform as proposed in Agenda 2000 for
the financial transfers within the EU. Agenda 2000 pro-
poses a further shift from price support to income sup-
port. The increased income payments to farmers are the
dominating expenditures item of the growing agricultural
budget. The allocation of these premiums becomes increas-
ingly determined by production pat-
terns, and hence independent from the
national GDP and VAT transfers that
balance the budget. Member states are
thus likely to face significant changes
in the resulting explicit net con-
tributions.
Apart from the explicit transfers, the
system of price support in the CAP
implies that member states receive or
pay implicit transfers. A country export-
ing agricultural products to another
member state implicitly benefits from
the gap between the internal and the
world market price. This often neglected
item is relevant for a more accurate
assessment of the costs and gains of
the CAP.  The net position of the
Netherlands in 1995 looks much more
favorable when these implicit subsi-
dies are taken into account. However,
lower internal prices under Agenda 2000 reduce the implicit
gain for the Netherlands, turning it into one of the largest
net payers in the future. 
These results should be interpreted with due caution.
First, calculations of explicit refunds and implicit subsi-
dies are sensitive to the assumed levels of world market
prices. Assessing the impact of an EU reform on world
markets even enhances the uncertainty of price projec-
Table 5 Implicit subsidies due to EU trade protection, 
1995 and 2005
1995 2005
mln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Austria 146 90 – 20 2
Belgium-Luxembourg – 151 16 – 74 – 54
Denmark 825 471 367 375
Finland 160 144 93 98
France 1328 645 596 470
Germany – 422 – 117 – 401 – 488
Greece – 564 – 313 – 87 – 93
Ireland 1217 363 192 214
Italy – 2675 – 1067 – 399 – 536
Netherlands 1522 883 394 533
Portugal – 291 – 146 – 60 – 16
Spain – 448 – 316 – 83 – 50
Sweden 107 29 11 13
UK – 754 – 681 – 531 – 468
Note: column elements add up to zero.
Table 6 Explicit and total net contribution, 1995 and 2005
1995 1995 2005 total
explicit total
mln ecu
Basecase A2000 Liberal
Austria – 848 (3) – 702 (5) – 80 (7) – 230 (6) – 50 (8)
Belgium-Luxembourg – 905 (5) – 1056 (2) – 912 (3) – 1114 (3) – 713 (3)
Denmark 119 (10) 944 (11) 486 (10) 439 (10) 64 (9)
Finland – 149 (7) 10 (8) 134 (9) 52 (9) 181 (10)
France – 1158 (8) 171 (9) 271 (8) – 274 (8) – 2455 (6)
Germany – 13079 (1) – 13501 (1) – 9693 (1) – 10693 (1) – 7544 (1)
Greece 3429 (13) 2865 (13) 3410 (13) 3433 (13) 3261 (13)
Ireland 1736 (14) 2953 (14) 1958 (14) 2256 (14) 1303 (14)
Italy – 632 (9) – 3307 (6) – 2304 (6) – 1456 (7) – 1136 (7)
Netherlands – 2220 (2) – 697 (7) – 1471 (2) – 2049 (2) – 1281 (2)
Portugal 2458 (12) 2167 (12) 2659 (12) 2723 (12) 2820 (12)
Spain 7206 (11) 6758 (10 4901 (11) 5369 (11) 4765 (11)
Sweden – 915 (4) –809 (4) – 621 (4) –589 (4) – 492 (4)
UK – 4741 (6) – 5495 (3) – 3046 (5) – 2176 (5) – 3032 (5)
Note: Ranking of total contribution per capita between brackets. 
Column elements do not add up to zero due to net expenditures that are not allocated to any member state.
4 8
98/2
BPCR E P O R T
tions. Second, compensation payments will be affected
by modulation factors, the range of which still is uncer-
tain. Third, this study does not consider the complete
Agenda 2000. The reorientation of the structural funds
opts for a reduction of transfers to the relatively rich mem-
bers. The costs of EU enlargement before 2005 have also
been neglected in the analysis (see CEC, 1997a). Finally,
Agenda 2000 is still a proposal and amendments by mem-
ber states are to be expected. Analyzing the bud-
getary implications clearly provides only one angle to
evaluate policy reforms. A full appraisal preferably con-
siders the welfare effects on European consumers. The
reform was motivated by other objectives as well, that
have not been considered here, in particular whether
the EU prepares itself adequately for the upcoming WTO
round and accession negotiations. n
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Notes
1 This model is developed as part of the FEA (Future of EuropeanAgriculture)
project, a joint venture of three institutes: the Agricultural Economic Research
Institute (LEI-DLO, The Hague), the Centre for World Food Studies (SOW-VU)
and CPB. The project is led by Prof. M.A. Keyzer (SOW-VU). J. Muskens (LEI-
DLO) also contributed to the development of the tool. The institutes present
a more comprehensive analysis of Agenda 2000 in SOW-VU, CPB, LEI-DLO
(1998), commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management
and Fisheries (Min-LNV).
2 The CEC has also announced adjustments for the olive oil, tobacco, fruit,
vegetables and wine sector in the course of this year. Notice that the sugar
sector is not subject to any reform.
3 The CEC (1997a) foresees an increase of total expenditures from 82 billion
ecu in 1997 to 109 billion ecu in 2005 (in 1997 prices).
4 Remember that the effect of changes in EU net exports on world market
prices is neglected in this analysis. An increase of the refund per unit fol-
lows when an increase of EU exports depresses the world market price.
5 The Dutch Ministry of Finance (1997) has calculated a net position of 2.0
bln ecu for 1995 (-0.68% of GNP).
6 See e.g. Lemmink (1995), CEC (1997b) and SER (1998).
